Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/76

 68, and under the direction of the councils entrusted with the common defence. To deny this would be to deny the means, and yet require the end. These must, therefore, be unlimited in every matter essential to its efficacy, that is, in the formation, direction, and support of the national forces. This was not doubted under the confederation; though the mode adopted to carry it into effect was utterly inadequate and illusory. There could be no real danger from the exercise of the power, it was not here, as in England, where the executive possessed the power to raise armies at pleasure; which power, so far as respected standing armies in time of peace, it became necessary to provide by the bill of rights, in 1688, should not be exercised without the consent of parliament. Here the power is exclusively confined to the legislative body, to the representatives of the states, and of the people of the states. And to suppose it will not be safe in their hands, is to suppose, that no powers of government, adapted to national exigencies, can ever be safe in any political body. Besides, the power is limited by the necessity (as will be seen) of biennial appropriations. The objection, too, is the more strange, because there are but two constitutions of the thirteen states, which attempt in any manner to limit the power; and these are rather cautions for times of peace, than prohibitions. The confederation itself contains no prohibition or limitation of the power. Indeed, in regard to times of war, it seems utterly preposterous to impose any