Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/402

 394 base purposes of gratifying a party, or of ministering to his own resentments, or of displacing upright and excellent officers for a mere difference of opinion. The public odium, which would inevitably attach to such conduct, would be a perfect security against it. And, in truth, removals made from such motives, or with a view to bestow the offices upon dependents, or favourites, would be an impeachable offence. One of the most distinguished framers of the constitution on that occasion, after having expressed his opinion decidedly in favour of the existence of the power of removal in the executive, added: "In the first place he will be impeachable by this house before the senate for such an act of mal-administration; for I contend, that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would subject him to impeachment, and removal from his high trust."

§ 1536. After a most animated discussion, the vote finally taken in the house of representatives was affirmative of the power of removal in the president, without any co-operation of the senate, by the vote of thirty-four members against twenty. In the senate the clause in the bill, affirming the power, was carried by the casting vote of the vice-president.

§ 1537. That the final decision of this question so made was greatly influenced by the exalted character of the president, then in office, was asserted at the time, and has always been believed. Yet the doctrine