Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/400

 392 to the necessity of sacrificing every principle of independence to the will of the chief magistrate, or of exposing themselves to the disgrace of being removed from office, and that too at a time, when it might no longer be in their power to engage in other pursuits.

§ 1534. The Federalist, while denying the existence of the power, admits by the clearest implication the full force of the argument, thus addressed to such a state of executive prerogative. Its language is: The consent of that body (the senate) would be necessary to displace, as well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate, therefore, could not occasion so violent, or so general a revolution in the officers of the government, as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new president would be restrained from attempting a change in favour of a person, more agreeable to him, by the apprehension, that a discountenance of the senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself. Those, who can best estimate the value of a steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision, which connects the official existence of public men with the approbation or disapprobation of that body, which, from the greater permanency of its own composition, will, in all probability, be less subject to inconstancy, than any other member of the government. No man can fail to perceive the entire safety of the power of removal, if it must thus be exercised in conjunction with the senate.