Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/389

 CH. XXXVII.] seems as nearly perfect for this purpose, as any one can be; and indeed it has been less censured, than any other important delegation of power in that instrument. Whether the senate should have a negative on presidential appointments, was a question, upon which the members of the convention were much divided. Mr. John Adams (afterwards president) was opposed to it; and a friendly correspondence took place between him and Mr. Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, (one of the framers of the constitution,) upon the subject. I extract from Mr. Pitkin's valuable History of the United States, the substance of the arguments urged on each side, as they present a general view of the reasoning, which had influence in the convention.

"To some general observations of Mr. Sherman in favour of this power in the senate, Mr. Adams made the following objections.

"'The negative of the senate upon appointments,' he said 'is liable to the following objections.

"'1. It takes away, or at least it lessens the responsibility of the executive—our constitution obliges me to say, that it lessens the responsibility of the president. The blame of an hasty, injudicious, weak, or wicked appointment, is shared so much between him and the senate, that his part of it will be too small. Who can censure him, without censuring the senate, and the legislatures who appoint them? all their friends will be interested to vindicate the president, in order to screen them from censure; besides, if an impeachment is brought before them against an officer, are they not interested to acquit him, lest some part of the odium of his guilt should fall upon them, who advised to his appointment?

"'2. It turns the minds and attention of the people to the senate, a branch of the legislature, in executive matters; it interests another branch of the legislature in the management of the executive; it divides the people between the executive and the senate: whereas all the people ought to be united to watch the executive, to oppose its encroachments, and resist its ambition. Senators and representatives, and their constituents—in short, the aristocratical and democratical divisions of society, ought to be united, on all occasions, to oppose the executive or the monarchical branch, when it attempts to overleap its limits. But how can this union be effected, when the aristocratical branch has pledged its reputation to the executive by consenting to an appointment?

"'3. It has a natural tendency, to excite ambition in the senate. An active, ardent spirit, in that house, who is rich, and able, has a great reputation and influence, will be solicited by candidates for office; not to introduce the idea of bribery, because, though it certainly would force itself in, in other countries, and will probably here, when we