Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol III).djvu/323

 CH. XXXVI.] was not, in some degree, connected with the presidential election; and no presidential election made, but what would depend upon artificial combinations, and a degrading favouritism. There would be ample room for the same course of intrigues, which has made memorable the choice of a king in the Polish diet, of a chief in the Venetian senate, and of a pope in the sacred college of the Vatican.

§ 1451. Assuming that the choice ought not to be confided to the national legislature, there remained various other modes, by which it might be effected; by the people directly; by the state legislatures; or by electors, chosen by the one, or the other. The latter mode was deemed most advisable; and the reasoning, by which it was supported, was to the following effect. The immediate election should be made by men, the most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favourable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the inducements, which ought to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow citizens from the general mass for this special object, would be most likely to possess the information, and discernment, and independence, essential for the proper discharge of the duty. It is also highly important to afford as little opportunity, as possible, to tumult and disorder. These evils are not unlikely to occur in the election of a chief magistrate directly by the people, considering the strong excitements and interests, which such an occasion may naturally be presumed to produce. The choice of a number of persons, to