Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/462

 454 and not destroy it. Had it been declared by a clause in the constitution, that the expenditures under this grant should be restricted to the construction, which 11 ight be given of the other grants, such restraint, though the most innocent, could not have failed to have had an injurious effect on the vital principles of the government, and often on its most important measures. Those, who might wish to defeat a measure proposed, might construe the power relied on in support of it, in a narrow and contracted manner, and in that way fix a precedent inconsistent with the true import of the grant. At other times, those, who favoured a measure, might give to the power relied on a forced or strained construction; and, succeeding in the object, fix a precedent in the opposite extreme. Thus it is manifest, that, if the right of appropriation be confined to that limit, measures may oftentimes be carried, or defeated by considerations and motives, altogether independent of, and unconnected with, their merits, and the several powers of congress receive constructions equally inconsistent with their true import. No such declaration, however, has been made; and from the fair import of the grant, and, indeed, its positive terms, the inference, that such was intended, seems to be precluded.

§ 986. Many considerations of great weight operate in favour of this construction, while I do not perceive any serious objection to it. If it be established, it follows, that the words, "to provide for the common defence and general welfare," have a definite, safe, and useful meaning. The idea of their forming an original grant with unlimited power, superseding every other grant, is abandoned. They will be considered, simply, as conveying a right of appropriation; a right indispensable to that of raising a revenue, and necessary to