Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/352

 344 whether the negative should in either case be exclusively vested in the president alone, or in him jointly with some other department of the government. The proposition of a qualified negative seems to have obtained general, but not universal support, having been carried by the vote of eight states against two. This being settled, the question, as to the number, was at first unanimously carried in the affirmative in favour of two thirds of each house; at a subsequent period it was altered to three fourths by a vote of six states against four, one being divided; and it was ultimately restored to the two thirds, without any apparent struggle. An effort was also made to unite the supreme national judiciary with the executive in revising the laws, and exercising the negative. But it was constantly resisted, being at first overruled by a vote of four states against three, two being divided, and finally rejected by the vote of eight states against three.

§ 879. Two points may properly arise upon this subject. First, the propriety of vesting the power in the president; and secondly, the extent of the legislative check, to prevent an undue exercise of it. The former also admits of a double aspect, viz. whether the negative should be absolute, or should be qualified. An absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first, to be the natural defence, with which the executive magistrate should be armed. But in a free government, it seems not altogether safe, nor of itself a sufficient defence. On ordinary occasions, it may not be exerted with the requisite firmness; and on extraordinary occasions, it may be perfidiously abused. It