Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/290

 282 be by them exercised. But, in extraordinary circumstances, the power is reserved to the national government; so that it may not be abused, and thus hazard the safety and permanence of the Union. Nor let it be thought, that such an occurrence is wholly imaginary. It is a known fact, that, under the confederation, Rhode-Island, at a very critical period, withdrew her delegates from congress; and thus prevented some important measures from being carried.

§ 815. Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive power in the state legislatures to regulate elections for the national government would leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could, at any time, annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs. It is no sufficient answer, that such an abuse of power is not probable. Its possibility is, in a constitutional view, decisive against taking such a risk; and there is no reason for taking it. The constitution ought to be safe against fears of this sort; and against temptations to undertake such a project. It is true, that the state legislatures may, by refusing to choose senators, interrupt the operations of the national government, and thus involve the country in general ruin. But, because, with a view to the establishment of the constitution, this risk was necessarily taken, when the appointment of senators was vested in the state legislatures; still it did not follow, that a powder so dangerous ought to be conceded in cases, where the same necessity did not exist. On the contrary, it became the duty of the convention, on this very account, not to multiply the chances of mischievous attempts of this sort. The risk, too, would be