Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/232

 224 of any individual, of whom he ordinarily could have little, or no personal knowledge, and in whose appointment he had concurred upon the judgment and recommendation of others? Such an influence is too remote to be of much weight in human affairs; and if it exists at all, it is too common to form a just exception to the competency of any forum.

§ 751. The next objection is to the inconvenience of the union of the power with that of making treaties. It has been strongly urged, that ambassadors are appointed by the president, with the concurrence of the senate; and if he makes a treaty, which is ratified by two thirds of the senate, however corrupt or exceptionable his conduct may have been, there can be little chance of redress by an impeachment. If the treaty be ratified, and the minister be impeached for concluding it, because it is derogatory to the honour, the interest, or perhaps to the sovereignty of the nation, who (it is said) are to be his judges? The senate, by whom it has been approved and ratified? If the president be impeached for giving improper instructions to the minister, and for ratifying the treaty pursuant to his instructions, who are to be his judges? The senate, to whom the treaty has been submitted, and by whom it has been approved and ratified? This would be to constitute the senators their own judges in every case of a corrupt or perfidious execution of their trust.

§ 752. Such is the objection pressed with unusual earnestness, and certainly having a more plausible foundation, than either of the preceding. It pre-supposes, however, a state of facts of a very extraordinary character, and having put an extreme case, argues from