Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/231

 CH. X.] § 750. The next objection is, that the power is not efficient or sale in connection with the agency of the senate in appointments. The argument is, that senators, who have concurred in an appointment, will be too indulgent judges of the conduct of the men, in whose efficient creation they have participated. The same objection lies with equal force against all governments, which entrust the power of appointment to any persons, who have a right to remove them at pleasure. It might in such cases be urged, that the favouritism of the appointor would always screen the misbehaviour of the appointees. Yet no one doubts the fitness of entrusting such a power; and confidence is reposed, and properly reposed, in the character and responsibility of those, who make the appointment. The objection is greatly diminished in its force by the consideration, that the senate has but a slight participation in the appointments to office. The president is to nominate and appoint; and the senate are called upon merely to confirm, or reject the nomination. They have no right of choice; and therefore must feel less solicitude, as to the individual, who is appointed. But, in fact, the objection is itself not well founded; for it will rarely occur, that the persons, who have concurred in the appointment, will be members of the senate at the time of the trial. As one third is, or may be, changed every two years, the case is highly improbable; and still more rarely can the fact of the appointment operate upon the minds of any considerable number of the senators. What possible operation could it have upon the judgment of a man of reasonable intelligence and integrity, that he had assented to the