Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/165

 CH. IX.] but her population is not equal to theirs by a hundred and thirty thousand; and the reason of this advantage, derived to her from the provisions of the bill, is, that her fraction, or residuum, is twelve thousand only, while theirs is a hundred and forty-four.

"But the subject is capable of being presented in a more exact and mathematical form. The house is to consist of two hundred and forty members. Now the precise proportion of power, out of the whole mass represented by the numbers two hundred and forty, which New-York would be entitled to according to her population, is 38.59; that is to say, she would be entitled to thirty-eight members, and would have a residuum, or fraction; and, even if a member were given her for that fraction, she would still have but thirty-nine; but the bill gives her forty.

"These are a part, and but a part, of those results produced by the bill in its present form, which the committee cannot bring themselves to approve. While it is not to be denied, that, under any rule of apportionment, some degree of relative inequality must always exist, the committee cannot believe, that the senate will sanction inequality and injustice to the extent, in which they exist in this bill, if they can be avoided. But recollecting the opinions, which had been expressed in the discussions of the senate, the committee have diligently sought to learn, whether there was not some other number, which might be taken for a ratio, the application of which would work out more justice and equality. In this pursuit the committee have not been successful. There are, it is true, other numbers, the adoption of which would relieve many of the states, which suffer under the present; but this relief would be obtained only by shifting the pressure on to other States, thus creating new grounds of complaint in other quarters. The number forty-four thousand has been generally spoken of, as the most acceptable substitute for forty-seven thousand seven hundred; but should this be adopted, great relative inequality would fall on several states, and, among them, on some of the new and growing states, whose relative disproportion, thus already great, would be constantly increasing. The committee, therefore, are of opinion, that the bill should be altered in the mode of apportionment. They think, that the process, which begins by assuming a ratio, should be abandoned, and that the bill ought to be framed on the principle of the amendment, which has been the main subject of discussion before the senate. The fairness of the principle of this amendment, and the general equity of its results, compared with those, which flow from the other process, seem plain and undeniable. The main question has been, whether the principle itself be constitutional; and this question the committee proceeded to and heart-burning; and a disposition on ono side to exert an undue influence, and on the other, to assume a hostile opposition. It relieves the executive