Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol II).djvu/158

 150 Vermont, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and South Carolina. As follows:

"And if two ratios may be applied, then fifteen may, and the distribution become arbitrary, instead of being apportioned to numbers.

"Another member of the clause of the constitution, which has been cited, says, ' the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000, but each state shall have, at least, one representative.' This last phrase proves that it had in contemplation, that all fractions, or numbers below the common ratio, were to be unrepresented; and it provides specially, that, in the case of a state whose whole number shall be below the common ratio, one representative shall be given to it. This is the single instance where it allows representation to any smaller number than the common ratio, and, by providing specially for it in this, shows it was understood, that, without special provision, the smaller number would, in this case, be involved in the general principle.

"The first phrase of the above citation, that 'the number of representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000,' is violated by this bill, which has given to eight states a number exceeding one for every 30,000, to wit, one for every 27,770.

"In answer to this, it is said, that this phrase may mean either the thirty thousands in each state, or the thirty thousands in the whole Union; and that, in the latter case, it serves only to find the amount of the whole representation, which, in the present state of population, is one hundred and twenty members. Suppose the phrase might bear both meanings, which will common sense apply to it? Which did the universal understanding of our country apply to it? Which did the senate and representatives apply to it during the pendency of the first bill, and even till an advanced stage of this second bill, when an ingenious gentleman found out the doctrine effractions—a doctrine so difficult and inobvious, as to be rejected, at first sight, by the very persons who afterwards  of each state. Any general regulation would have worked with some inequality.

§ 684. The next clause is, that "the house of representatives shall choose their speaker, and other