Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol I).djvu/58

 18 power to extinguish that right was vested in that government, which might constitutionally exercise it.

§ 30. Virginia, particularly, within whose chartered limits the land in controversy lay, passed an act, in the year 1779, declaring her "exclusive right of pre-emption from the Indians of all the lands within the limits of her own chartered territory, and that no persons whatsoever have, or ever had, a right to purchase any lands within the same from any Indian nation, except only persons duly authorized to make such purchase, formerly for the use and benefit of the colony, and lately for the Commonwealth." The act then proceeds to annul all deeds made by Indians to individuals for the private use of the purchasers.

§ 31. Without ascribing to this act the power of annulling vested rights, or admitting it to countervail the testimony furnished by the marginal note opposite to the title of the law forbidding purchases from the Indians, in the revisals of the Virginia statutes, stating that law to be repealed, it may safely be considered as an unequivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad principle, which had always been maintained, that the exclusive right to purchase from the Indians resided in the government.

§ 32. In pursuance of the same idea, Virginia proceeded, at the same session, to open her land-office for the sale of that country, which now constitutes Kentucky, a country, every acre of which was then claimed and possessed by Indians, who maintained their title with as much persevering courage, as was ever manifested by any people.

§ 33. The States having within their chartered limits different portions of territory covered by Indians, ceded that territory, generally, to the United States, on