Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol I).djvu/497

 CH. VI.] interests of the parts, as connected with that of the whole. Ii can apply the revenues of the whole to the defence of any particular part, and that more easily and expediciously, than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert, and unity of system." The Federalist, No. 4.—The following passages from the Federalist, No. 51, present the subject of the advantages of the Union in a striking light: "There are, moreover, two considerations particularly applicable to the federal system of America, which place it in a very interesting point of view.

"First: In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate departments, In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.

"Secondly: It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil: The one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary, or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power, independent of the society, may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from, and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government, the security for civil rights must be the same, as that for religious rights. It consists, in the one case, in the multiplicity of interests, and Upon some of these topics, we may enlarge hereafter.