Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol I).djvu/286

 246 functions. It was objected, that either the whole superstructure would thus fall, from its own intrinsic feebleness; or, engrossing all the attributes of sovereignty, entail upon the country a most execrable form of government in the shape of an irresponsible aristocracy. (6.) The want of an exclusive power in the general government to issue paper money; and thus to prevent the inundation of the country with a base currency, calculated to destroy public faith, as well as private morals. (7.) The too frequent rotation required by the confederation in the office of members of congress, by which the advantages, resulting from long experience and knowledge in the public affairs, were lost to the public councils. (8.) The want of judiciary power co-extensive with the powers of the general government.

§ 266. In respect to this last defect, the language of the Federalist contains so full an exposition, that no farther comment is required. "Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in the last resort, to one supreme tribunal. And this tribunal ought to be instituted under the same authority, which forms the treaties themselves. These