Page:Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1st ed, 1833, vol I).djvu/285

 CH. IV.] of government. It is not necessary to go at large into a consideration of them. It will suffice for the present purpose to enumerate the principal heads. (1.) The principle of regulating the contributions of the states into the common treasury by quotas, apportioned according to the value of lau.ls, which (as has been already suggested) was objected to, as unjust, unequal, and inconvenient in its operation. (2.) The want of a mutual guaranty of the state governments, so as to protect them against domestic insurrections, and usurpations destructive of their liberty. (3.) The want of a direct power to raise armies, which was objected to, as unfriendly to vigour and promptitude of action, as well as to economy and a just distribution of the public burthens. (4.) The right of equal suffrage among all the states, so that the least in point of wealth, population, and means stood equal in the scale of representation with those, which were the largest. From this circumstance it might, nay it must happen, that a majority of the states, constituting a third only of the people of America, could control the rights and interests of the other two thirds. Nay, it was constitutionally, not only possible, but true in fact, that even the votes of nine states might not comprehend a majority of the people in the Union. The minority, therefore, possessed a negative upon the majority. (5.) The organization of the whole powers of the general government in a single assembly, without any separate or distinct distribution or the executive, judicial, and legislative