Page:Jones v. State, 357 Ark. 545 (2004).pdf/6

550 because of the weakness of the substance. Appellant also moved for a directed verdict on the drug-paraphernalia charge. The trial court denied both motions. Appellant renewed his motions for directed verdict after the defense rested, and the trial court again denied appellant's motions.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Prior to the sentencing phase of the trial, appellant objected to the trial court's giving the AMCI 2d 9202 jury instruction, which does not allow the jury to consider imposing only a fine. Appellant proffered modified jury instructions and verdict forms, but the trial court rejected these forms.

The jury then sentenced appellant to eight years for the offense of possession of methamphetamine and ten years for the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The judgment and commitment order was entered on June 10, 2003. Appellant brings his appeal from that order.

[1, 2] Recently, in Jordan v. State, 356 Ark. 248, 147 S.W.3d 691 (2004), we articulated the standard of review for motions for directed verdict: "It is well settled that we treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Mills v. State, 351 Ark. 523, 95 S.W.3d 796 (2003); Williams v. State, 346 Ark. 304, 57 S.W.3d 706 (2001). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 58 S.W.3d 336 (2001). On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that evidence that supports the verdict. Williams, 346 Ark. 304, 57 S.W3d 706." Jordan, supra.

For his first point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the constructive-possession charge. Specifically, appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the charge of constructive possession of methamphetamine.