Page:Jones v. State, 357 Ark. 545 (2004).pdf/12

556 (2001) (holding that the evidence clearly established that a syringe was considered drug paraphernalia when found inside a residence that also contained methamphetamine). Nothing in the record reveals that appellant possessed the syringe for a legitimate use.

[12] Therefore, based upon our standard of review, the evidence is of sufficient force or character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture under Haynes, supra. For these reasons, we affirm on this point.

For his fourth point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to give appellant's proffered jury instructions on the imposition of fines after the finding that appellant was an habitual offender. Specifically, appellant contends that Arkansas statutes allow the imposition of a fine without imprisonment, notwithstanding a defendant's status as an habitual offender under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501 et seq.

After the guilt phase of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury that appellant had ten prior felony convictions and classified him as an habitual offender under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-501 et seq. Appellant objected to the trial court's giving the AMCI 2d 9202 jury instruction, which provided that appellant was subject to three to thirty years' imprisonment on each count. Appellant argued that AMCI 2d 9202 did not give the jury the option of assessing a fine alone.

AMCI 2d 9202 provides: "You have found [appellant] guilty of the offense of __________. The State has also alleged that [appellant] is subject to an extended term of imprisonment as an habitual offender. It is my duty to instruct you that [appellant] has previously been convicted of __________ felonies and is classified as an habitual offender.

The offense of __________ when committed by an habitual offender is punishable by imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction for a term of __________." Id.

This jury instruction was based upon the language of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104 (1987), which provided in pertinent part: "(d) A defendant convicted of an offense other than a Class Y felony, capital murder, treason, or murder in the second degree, may"