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32 since the mid-19th century, the statutory scheme for postconviction review has permitted petitions based not only on a “violation of the constitution” but also on a “violation of the … law of the United States.” Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, §1, 14 Stat. 385; see also §2255; W. Church, Writ of Habeas Corpus §169, p. 249 (2d ed. 1893) (“The issue raised on the hearing of a habeas corpus may be one of law simply”).

To the extent the majority’s assessment of the purportedly nascent nature of statutory innocence claims rests on its view that, at the time of the founding, habeas relief was rarely available when a petition was brought by a convicted individual (as opposed to a pretrial detainee),, there are two additional problems. For one thing, even assuming that a detainee-versus-convict scope-of-habeas distinction existed at the dawn of our Nation, Congress has