Page:Jones v. Hendrix.pdf/60

28 generally prohibits a court from inferring that the “inclu[sion of] one item … is to exclude other similar items” in order to read a statute as forbidding review of a postconviction claim. 560 U. S., at 648; see also id., at 649 (“counsel[ing] hesitancy before interpreting AEDPA’s statutory silence as indicating a congressional intent to close courthouse doors”). Yet, here, as the majority appears to admit, the only way to read §2255(h) as barring Jones’s statutory innocence claim is to infer that such preclusion is what Congress intended. ,.

This case would have been easily resolved if we had applied the clear-statement rule at the outset, as we have always done in cases of this nature. Doing so would have appropriately eliminated a reading of §2255(h) that forecloses access to habeas relief by negative implication. Use of the rule would have thus protected core constitutional norms by “ensur[ing] Congress does not, by broad or general language, legislate on a sensitive topic inadvertently or without due deliberation.” Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U. S. 119, 139 (2005) (opinion of Kennedy, J.); see also Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 65 (1989).

In the last few pages of its opinion, the Court makes the unceremonious (but still startling) announcement that the clear-statement rule is inapplicable to today’s analysis of §2255(h). Try as it might, in my view, the majority has failed to provide a single persuasive reason for this dramatic break.

First, the majority suggests that the clear-statement rule is not appropriate when interpreting provisions related to