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Rh in light of §2255(h)’s successive-petition bar. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F. 3d 578, 605 (CA10 2011) (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority also fails to grapple with this Court’s own opinions that suggest a broader interpretation of the saving clause is proper. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372, 381–382 (1977); Sanders, 373 U. S., at 14–15; Hayman, 342 U. S., at 223; Brief for Respondent 17–18.

It appears the majority’s interpretation of §2255(e) is primarily attributable to its concern that interpreting the saving clause to permit Jones to file a habeas petition might authorize an “end-run” around §2255’s procedures. , . I think those fears are vastly overblown.

Properly interpreted, a §2255 motion is only “inadequate or ineffective” when the potential procedural bar does not provide a prisoner with any meaningful opportunity to present a claim. And that circumstance does not exist any time a procedural limitation in §2255 screens out a claim. For example, if an individual does not raise his legal innocence claim in a §2255 motion in a timely fashion, see §2255(f), he cannot resort to the saving clause to file a habeas petition; that individual did have a meaningful opportunity to raise his claim pursuant to the §2255 process, but missed the window of opportunity. Similarly, where Congress has clearly narrowed the scope of postconviction relief—as it has done for claims of new evidence and new constitutional rules—it has overridden the equivalence aim that would otherwise render §2255 inadequate or ineffective, such that