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20 Next, Jones points to Fiore v. White, 531 U. S. 225 (2001) (per curiam), which applied the rule that due process requires that the prosecution prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., at 228–229. Whether a due process error has occurred at trial, however, is an entirely different issue from Congress’ power to restrict collateral review. Due process does not guarantee a direct appeal, McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687 (1894), let alone the opportunity to have legal issues redetermined in successive collateral attacks on a final sentence.

Jones’ last constitutional contention—that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments may entitle him to another round of collateral review—fails for a similar reason. By its terms, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause expresses a substantive constraint on the kinds of punishments governments may “inflic[t].” It creates no freestanding entitlement to a second or successive round of postconviction review, and thus it adds nothing to Jones’ unavailing Suspension Clause argument.

The Government agrees with the Eighth Circuit that Jones is not entitled to relief, but, somewhat surprisingly, it asks us to adopt a novel, alternative interpretation of the saving clause, which it constructs via a roundabout argument. It begins with the premise that the words “inadequate or ineffective” imply reference to a “benchmark” of adequacy and effectiveness. It proceeds to identify that benchmark as the ability to test the types of claims cognizable under the general habeas statutes—specifically, those governing federal habeas petitions by state prisoners. The Government then reasons that §2255(h)’s limitations on second or successive motions asserting newly discovered evidence or new rules of constitutional law do not trigger the