Page:Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.pdf/4

 the terms of section 16-55-212(b) of the CJRA, limiting the evidence to only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of Johnson or which remained unpaid and for which Johnson or any third party was legally responsible. Petitioners argued to the district court that such an interpretation and application of section 16-55-212(b) was a limitation on damages in violation of the Arkansas Constitution and offended the separation-of-powers doctrine.

Petitioners and Respondents then filed a joint motion for certification of the above-stated questions to this court on August 11, 2008. On August 21, 2008, the district court granted the motion. We now turn to providing an answer to each of the certified questions.

It is well settled that there is a presumption of validity attending every consideration of a statute's constitutionality; every act carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, and before an act will be held unconstitutional,the incompatibility between it and the constitution must be clear. See Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 258 S.W.3d 744 (2007). Any doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute must be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. See id. The heavy burden of demonstrating the unconstitutionality is upon the one attacking it. See id. Finally, when possible, we will construe a statute so that it is constitutional. See id.

In determining the constitutionality of the statutes, we look to the rules of statutory construction. When construing a statute, the basic rule is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. See Rose v. Arkansas State Plant Bd., 363 Ark. 281, 213 S.W.3d 607 (2005). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. See id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted Rh