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124 last which could have commended itself to him. It would have involved Great Britain directly in the quarrel. It would have thrown Persia into the arms of Russia; it would have led Great Britain into diplomatic, possibly into military collision with the Western Power. What the Foreign Office wished was indeed the reverse of what Mr. Colvin in his letter of January 21, 1838, to Burnes had anticipated. It was in Afghánistán that the battle of Europe and of Persia was to be fought. Owing to its length, so much only of the Despatch can be here printed as deals with an expedition to Kábul; and of that again so much only as is most material. The instructions which were conveyed to Lord Auckland differ so far, it will be seen, from the course which he pursued, in that they leave him discretion to make another effort to gain over Dost Muhammad and his brothers. Possibly such an effort might have succeeded. On the other hand, Lord Auckland's distrust of the Bárakzáis, the unshaken influence of Russia at Teherán, and the effect in India of the withdrawal of the British Agent from Kábul in the circumstances which accompanied it, might have seemed to Lord Auckland to be a bar to the resumption of negotiations. Be this as it may, when the Despatch arrived on January 16, 1839, war had been declared; the army was on its way; the Government of India was pledged to its policy. All bridges of retreat had been broken.

'14. We have heard,' wrote the Secret Committee, 'with the utmost regret that the Mission to Kábul, conducted by