Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/406

384 and ground, would come together over a wide area to produce a decisive action. He believed that analysis of those elements in the battle area, including the range of weapons and their rates of fire, the size of the opposing forces, the terrain over which they would advance, and the speed of that advance, would permit development of more effective operational concepts. In addition, he thought consideration had to be given to "force generation," the task of concentrating the combat power of the division for the central battle. These ideas evolved into the "AirLand Battle" doctrine, which was published in 1982 in the revised Field Manual, 100-5, Operations.13

Analysis of combat within the framework of the AirLand Battle concept led to the development of "Division-86," so named because 1986 was as far out as General Meyer and his advisers could project the threat. Because of the importance of Europe to national security, Division-86, like the Division Restructuring Study, emphasized a standardized heavy division, which combined both armored and mechanized infantry divisions, and focused on maximizing the new equipment entering the inventory. In October 1979, four months after General Edward C. Meyer became Chief of Staff, Starry presented his Division-86 proposal, which Meyer approved in principle on the 18th of that month. His final decision about fielding such a division depended upon studies to be conducted for light divisions (infantry, airborne, and airmobile), corps, and echelons above the corps level.14

Division-86, as presented to General Meyer, retained the flexible ROAD structure. The new heavy division consisted of a headquarters and headquarters company; three brigade headquarters; a military police company; signal, air defense artillery, engineer, and military intelligence battalions; a reconnaissance squadron; division artillery; an air cavalry attack brigade; a division support command; and a number of maneuver elements to be determined, possibly four or five mechanized infantry battalions and five or six armor battalions, The division would total approximately 20,000 officers and enlisted men (Chart 45).15

Under the "come-as-you-are, fight-as-you-are" approach to war, combat service support had to be immediately available in the battle area. To meet the new