Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/338

 316 ommended more aircraft for infantry, mechanized infantry, and armored divisions; and the formation of aviation units for corps, army, and special warfare units.

The Continental Army Command developed tables of organization for a ROAD-type air assault division, which the Department of the Army decided to test. The first step was the activation of the 11th Air Assault Division (the former 11th Airborne Division) on 1 February 1963, along with the 10th Air Transport Brigade, at Fort Benning, Georgia, As proposed by the Howze Board, the air transport brigade was not organic to the division, but was to serve as a lines of communications unit for hauling men, equipment, and supplies in the field, In October and November 1964 the experimental division, including 3,250 soldiers from the 2d Infantry Division, and the transport brigade conducted full-scale tests of assault tactics. At the conclusion of the test the director, Lt. Gen. Charles W. G. Rich, recommended the addition of both units to the permanent force structure. He reported that the integration of Army aircraft into the ground units provided the crucial maneuver capability for light mobile forces to close with and destroy the enemy. Operating with other divisions, airmobile units offered a balance of mobility and increased Army combat readiness on a theater level.

The recommendation to organize an airmobile division set off a debate within the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. Air Force had been watching the development and growth of Army aviation for years with increasing concern. Each divisional reorganization after World War II resulted in more aircraft being added to these units. The chief of staff, U.S. Air Force, believed activation of the division premature and judged it too specialized to be cost effective, Although not stated, the Air Force felt that airmobility infringed on its ground support mission. Earlier in the 1960s the Air Force had conducted tests to enhance the mobility and combat effectiveness of divisions by improving troop lift, aerial resupply, close air support, and aerial fire support, but found most of the Army's equipment too large for its aircraft. At the time the Air Force had recommended that the Army develop equipment in the infantry division that was more compatible with existing Air Force planes. McNamara now disagreed. He and the Defense Department staff had been pushing for greater Army involvement in aviation since 1962. The Army's proposal met his approval, and he directed the formation of an airmobile division as part of the permanent force. The air transport brigade, however, did not win a place in the force.

The Army Staff selected the 1st Cavalry Division to become the Army's first airmobile division. Since that unit was serving in Korea, this resulted in a massive paper shuffle, with men and materiel remaining in place and unit designations moving back and forth. In the end the Korean-based 1st Cavalry Division was replaced by the 2d Infantry Division while the assets of the 2d Infantry Division and 11th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning were used to reorganize the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

The 1st Cavalry Division's configuration differed from the test unit (Chart 40). It had no Little John rocket battalion or attack helicopter battalion because the Air