Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/331

 A NEW DIRECTION—FLEXIBLE RESPONSE Departing from past practice, the Defense Department decided to reorganize the reserve divisions concurrently with the Regular Army's conversion to ROAD. Immediately the old question arose about the number of divisions needed in the reserves to meet mobilization requirements. Studies after the pentomic reorganization suggested that the Army needed forty-three divisions, including twenty-nine in the reserves. The new numbers gave the Army a surplus of eight reserve divisions, but Army leaders also wanted more separate brigades to add flexibility to the force. Late in 1962 the Defense Department approved reorganizing reserve units under ROAD.

Following the Defense Department's guidance, the Army Staff decided to retain one Army Reserve division in each of the six Army areas and to eliminate four divisions. Army commanders selected the 63d, 77th, 81st, 83d, 90th, and 102d Infantry Divisions for retention and reorganized them under ROAD by the end of April 1963, Each division had two tank and six infantry battalions. With the elimination of the 79th, 94th, 96th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, the Army decided to retain their headquarters as a way to preserve spaces for general and field grade officers. It reorganized the units as operational headquarters (subsequently called command headquarters [division]) and directed them to supervise the training of combat and support units located in the former divisional areas and to provide for their administrative support, If an extensive mobilization were to occur, the staff believed that these units could become the nuclei for new divisions.

In December 1962 Secretary Vance asked the states and territories to accept a new National Guard troop allotment containing 23 divisions (6 armored and 17 infantry). The Army Staff initially planned to mechanize two of the seventeen infantry divisions, but shortages of equipment forced their retention as standard infantry organizations. Somewhat reluctantly, the governors accepted the new troop basis. By 1 May 1963 the states completed the reorganization, a month ahead of schedule, with the infantry divisions having two tank and six infantry battalions and the armored divisions controlling five tank and four mechanized infantry battalions.

Because of equipment shortages each National Guard infantry division lacked its full ROAD base. The states were allowed to omit two company-size units in each division base from the following menu: an airmobile company in the aviation battalion, an air cavalry troop in the reconnaissance squadron, or the Honest John battery in the composite artillery battalion. They chose not to organize a total of 16 air cavalry troops, 13 airmobile companies, and 5 Honest John batteries.

In planning the ROAD reorganization, the Army Staff determined that the Regular Army needed one airborne and five infantry brigades for unique missions not appropriate for a division. The airborne brigade was to replace the battle group on Okinawa, thus significantly increasing the forces there, and the infantry brigades were to serve in Berlin, Alaska, the Canal Zone, and the United States. No fixed combination of maneuver elements was established for the brigades, which were, instead, to be tailored for their special missions.