Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/315

A NEW DIRECTION—FLEXIBLE RESPONSE When completed, MOMAR-1 called for heavy and medium divisions (Charts 34 and 35), Both types had five combat commands, but within the commands were three task force headquarters to which commanders could assign tank and infantry companies and elements of a train (support) company and "moritzer" battery. The proposed moritzer was to be a cross between a mortar and howitzer. Thus, the new models retained the flexible command structure of the armored division and foreshadowed the idea of "building blocks" around which to organize forces. Every man and every piece of equipment in both divisions was to be carried or mounted on vehicles.

War games indicated that medium and heavy MOMAR-1 divisions could not meet the Army's needs in many potential trouble spots throughout the world, and they were never field tested. In December 1960 the Vice Chief of Staff, General Clyde Eddleman, rejected the concept entirely. He noted that MOMAR-1 divisions lacked the simplicity, homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility that the Army needed to fulfill its worldwide responsibility in the coming decade.

General Eddleman set the Army on a new organizational course on 16 December 1960 when he directed General Herbert B. Powell, who had replaced Clarke as commander of the Continental Army Command, to develop divisions for the period 1961–65. The vice chief wanted the command to consider infantry, armored, and mechanized divisions, The heart of his mechanized division was to be armored infantry units that had the mobility and the survivability needed for the nuclear battlefield. But all divisions were to have both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as any other new weapons or equipment that might become available by 1965, Because of the many areas for potential employment throughout the world, Eddleman suggested that divisions be tailored for different environments. However, since he still wanted to make the types of divisions as similar as possible, Eddleman instructed the planners to weigh the retention of battle groups or their replacement with infantry battalions in both infantry and airborne divisions. He questioned whether those divisions should have a combat command or a regimental command level between the division commander and the battalions as in the armored division. Furthermore, preliminary evidence suggested the possibility of interchanging battalion-size armor, mechanized infantry, infantry, and artillery units within the divisions. No set strengths were established for divisions, but Eddleman expected none to exceed 15,000 men.

Eddleman's instructions reflected many of the organizational ideas he had developed after leaving the position of deputy chief of staff for military operations in May 1958 and before returning to Washington as the vice chief of staff in November 1960. In the intervening period he served as commander of U.S. Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, becoming involved with the establishment of the West German Army. That army, unlike those of some NATO countries that had adopted