Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/313



I am directing the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reorganization and modernization of the Army's divisional structure, lo increase its non-nuclear firepower, to improve its tactical mobility in any environment, to insure its flexibility to meet any direct or indirect threat, to facilitate its coordination with our major allies, and to provide more modern mechanized divisions in Europe and bring their equipment up to date, and [to provide] new airborne brigades in both the Pacific and Europe. President John F, Kennedy

President John F. Kennedy ushered in the era of "flexible response" in 1961, deciding that the threat of a general nuclear war had become remote, but that the possibility of brush-fire wars had increased. To meet the varied challenges of the era, the Army soon abandoned pentomic structures and struck out in new directions. Eventually divisions with a standard divisional base and interchangeable maneuver elements—infantry, mechanized infantry, airborne infantry, and armor battalions—emerged as a means of tailoring units for service in diverse environments, The idea theoretically resulted in more flexible forces and divisions that took full advantage of new equipment, in particular new tanks, armored personnel carriers, and helicopters. International events delayed immediate reorganization, and when the Army was able to act, constraints on personnel and funds forced the adoption of many compromises in the structure of the divisions that emerged.

To move beyond the unrealistic PENTANA concept of a universal division, General Bruce C. Clarke, commander of the Continental Army Command, put his staff to work in early 1959 on a new organizational model, the "Modern Mobile Army 1965 (MOMAR-1)." Clarke, who had served as General Maxwell D, Taylor's deputy in Korea, believed the Army of the future had to be capable of operating effectively on both nuclear and nonnuclear battlefields anywhere in the world against a variety of threats, Its units had to be capable of fighting independently or semi-independently under a diverse set of geographical and climatic conditions. Furthermore, he believed that conventional firepower had to be increased and tactical mobility and maneuverability improved, primarily by using armor-protected vehicles and aircraft.