Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/291

 THE SEARCH OF ATOMIC AGE DIVISIONS battalions and eight four-company infantry battalions, while the armored division had one heavy and three medium tank battalions and four infantry battalions of four companies each. To improve command and control, separate division headquarters, aviation, and administration companies replaced the headquarters battalion. The division's artillery reverted to its traditional structure of a headquarters and headquarters battery, a medical detachment, and one 155-mm. and three 105-mm. howitzer battalions with an antiaircraft artillery battery in each battalion. A reconnaissance battalion, identical to the one in the armored division, improved the "eyes and ears" of the infantry division. Engineer resources were increased in both divisions, and a bridge company was restored to the armored division. The support commands in both organizations were restructured to consist of a headquarters and headquarters company, a band, military police and medical companies, a maintenance battalion, and a supply and transport unit. In the infantry division the supply and transport unit remained a company, while in the tank division it was a battalion. The signal battalion in both divisions continued to furnish an area system of communications. These changes increased the strength of the infantry division from 13,542 to 17,027 troops and the armored division from 11,930 to 13,971.

Maj. Gen. George E. Lynch, the "Marne" Division commander, and Maj. Gen. Robert L. Howze, commanding "Old Ironsides," reached different conclusions about the revised divisions. Lynch found that the infantry division operated in much the same manner as a conventional division with an improved logistical system. He nevertheless concluded that the Army should return to the traditional division organization with three regimental combat teams, which, he believed, were as flexible as combat commands. Furthermore, Lynch thought regimental organization fostered morale; encouraged teamwork between subordinate and superior commanders, as well as their staffs; provided knowledge about capabilities and weaknesses of units and their leaders; and stimulated cooperative working methods. Lynch's proposed changes raised the divisional strength to 21,678 officers and enlisted men. Howze, on the other hand, found the armored division generally acceptable. He suggested returning all mess and second-echelon maintenance to the company level, converting the medical unit to a battalion, forming headquarters and service companies or batteries for battalions in all the arms, concentrating antiaircraft resources into one battalion, and augmenting maintenance throughout the division. Howze did not specify the strength of his proposed division, but Lt. Gen. John H. Collier, Fourth Army commander, in whose area the operation was conducted, reported on the test and recommended 15,819 of all ranks.

In 1956 the U.S. Continental Army Command, which had replaced Army Field Forces, distributed revised tables of organization for Atomic Field Army divisions throughout the Army for review and comment. While controversies persisted, the command noted that gains had been made in the infantry division's ability to carry out a variety of missions and to protect itself against atomic attack. The Atomic Field Army studies refrained from making any revolutionary changes