Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/287

THE SEARCH OF ATOMIC AGE DIVISIONS believed, to make divisions more mobile, more flexible, and less vulnerable to atomic attack. To achieve such goals he directed Army Field Forces to explore the following seven objectives: (1) greater combat manpower ratios; (2) greater combat to support unit ratios; (3) greater flexibility and greater mobility in combat units; (4) maximum use of technological improvements; (5) improvements in the Army's capability to sustain land combat; (6) development of tactical doctrine to support the changes; and (7) reorganization of the units by 1 January 1956.

Although Army Field Forces became the executive agent for the study, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth did much of the work required to meet the tight schedule. The study centered on infantry and armored divisions because of the similarity between infantry and airborne divisions. Changes in the infantry division would automatically apply to major aspects of the airborne division. By the fall of 1954 Army Field Forces had developed the Atomic Field Army, or "ATFA–1," which it believed could be organized in 1956.

Under ATFA–1 infantry and armored divisions were as similar as possible (Chart 26). The infantry division included a separate headquarters battalion; signal, engineer, and tank battalions; seven infantry battalions; division artillery; and a support command. Within the division headquarters battalion were aviation and reconnaissance companies, and within its headquarters and service company were three combat command headquarters along with the divisional staff. One 4.2-inch mortar and two 105-mm. howitzer battalions made up the division artillery. The support command, a new organization, comprised a battalion, which included medical, maintenance, supply and transport, and personnel service companies. Divisional elements lost all administrative functions except those needed to maintain unit efficiency. Personnel for administration, mess, and maintenance functions were concentrated in battalion headquarters companies throughout. All staffs were minimal; the divisional G–1 and G–4 functions were reduced to policy, planning, and coordinating activities. Routine administrative and logistical matters were moved to the support command. Infantry divisions, similar to armored divisions, were to use task force organizations as situations required. Combat command headquarters, the combat arms battalions, and the support units were the building