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 THE KOREAN WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH support armored and airborne training. They thought thirteen, rather than twelve, reserve divisions should be maintained to provide a better geographic distribution of the units. The Section V Committee opposed the reduction of the Organized Reserve Corps from twenty-five to thirteen divisions because it feared unfavorable publicity, particularly with the nation at war. On 20 December the Vice Chief of Staff, General John E. Hull, delayed reduction in the number of Reserve Corps divisions until 31 December 1952 but directed the reorganization and redesignation of airborne and armored divisions as infantry as soon as practicable. In March 1952 the 80th, 84th, 100th, and 108th Airborne Divisions were reorganized and redesignated as infantry divisions, and the 63d, 70th, and 75th Infantry Divisions replaced the 13th, 21st, and 22d Armored Divisions. The Army made no other divisional changes in the reserve troop basis at that time.

Along with the reorganization of the Organized Reserve Corps divisions, the Army published new regulations formalizing a "Ready Reserve" concept. Under the new rules the Ready Reserve comprised Early and Late Ready Forces, categories which replaced the old Class A, B, and C units. The Early Ready Force was to have 110 percent officer and 100 percent enlisted strength, while the Late Ready Force, which included all Organized Reserve Corps divisions, was to have 100 percent officer and 5 percent enlisted strength. In July 1952 Congress passed new legislation that redesignated the Organized Reserve Corps as the Army Reserve and gave legal status to the concept of the Ready Reserve.

Before the dust had settled on the reforms, the Army realized that it had failed to improve unit manning or meet reasonable mobilization requirements. In the fall of 1952 Army leaders thus proposed that the personnel from the thirteen inactivated Army Reserve divisions be assigned to strengthen the remaining twelve divisions. A new reserve troop basis resulted, this time calling for 37 divisions, 27 in the National Guard and 10 in the Army Reserve. To keep the unneeded fifteen Army Reserve divisions active, they were to be reorganized as training divisions to staff training centers upon mobilization or man maneuver area commands for training troops. The continental army commanders implemented the new Army Reserve troop basis in 1955 piecemeal. They reorganized, without approved tables of organization, the 70th, 76th, 78th, 80th, 84th, 85th, 89th, 91st, 95th, 98th, 100th, and 108th Infantry Divisions as cadre for replacement training centers and organized the 75th "Maneuver Area Commands" using the resources of the 75th Infantry Division. Two years later the 75th Infantry Division was inactivated along with 87th Infantry Division. Assets of the 87th were used to organize a maneuver area command; thus one unneeded division remained in the troop basis.

To prepare for challenges in Western Europe, the new troop basis authorized the conversion of four National Guard infantry divisions to armored divisions. New York, California, Georgia, and Florida agreed to convert the 27th, 40th, and 48th Infantry Divisions. For the fourth armored division, the Army planned to use the slot temporarily occupied by the 44th Infantry Division, which Illinois no longer wanted. Eventually Tennessee and North Carolina, which shared the 30th Infantry