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Japan, provided the basic methodology for execution but did not control the pace of the reduction. As after World War I, the Army failed to prepare a general demobilization plan. Demobilization thus proceeded rapidly, driven largely by public pressure and reduced resources, without the benefit of sound estimates about the size and location of the occupation forces that the Army would need or the length of time that they would have to serve overseas. The divisions that returned to the United States in 1945 and 1946 were generally administrative holding organizations without any combat capability. They were paper organizations "to bring the boys home."

Within a year after the end of the war in Europe, the number of divisions on active duty dropped from 89 to 16 (Table 17); of these, 12 were engaged in occupation duty: 3 in Germany, 1 in Austria, 1 in Italy, 1 in the Philippine Islands, 4 in Japan, and 2 in Korea. The remaining 4 were in the United States. By the end of January 1947 three more infantry divisions overseas were inactivated: the 42d in Austria; the 9th in Germany; and the 86th in the Philippine Islands. In addition, the 3d Infantry Division was withdrawn from Germany and sent to Camp (later Fort) Campbell, Kentucky, where it replaced the 5th Division. When demobilization ended in 1947, the number of active divisions stood at twelve.