Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/185

 PRELUDE TO COMBAT The GHQ maneuvers also had a significant impact on the organization of the armored division. The exercises led to numerous situations that called for infantry, artillery, and armor to form combat teams, but the division lacked the resources to organize them. The division as organized was heavy in armor but too light in both infantry and artillery. The armored brigade complicated the command channel, while the service elements needed greater control. To correct these weaknesses, the Armored Force, under the direction of Maj. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, dramatically reorganized the division (Chart 16). The armored brigade headquarters and one armored regiment were eliminated, and the remaining two armored regiments were reorganized to consist of one light and two medium tank battalions each. Three self-propelled 105-mm. howitzer battalions replaced the field artillery regiment and battalion, and control of the division artillery passed to an artillery section in the division headquarters. The infantry regiment was reorganized to consist of three battalions of three companies each, and trucks replaced armored personnel carriers. The engineer battalion was authorized four, rather than three, line companies and a bridge company. Two combat command headquarters were authorized but were to have no assigned units, allowing the division commander to build fighting teams as the tactical situation dictated yet still have units in reserve. Maintenance and supply battalions replaced ordnance and quartermaster battalions, the maintenance unit taking over all motor repairs in the division. For better control of the service elements, division trains were added and placed under the command of a colonel. A service company was also added to provide transportation and supplies for the rear echelon of the division headquarters company.

The 4th Division had tested the motorized structure along with attached tank, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery units during the Carolina portion of the GHQ maneuvers in the fall of 1941. At their termination, the division commander, Brig. Gen. Fred C. Wallace, reported to General Twaddle that the force was "undesirably large." Furthermore, deficiencies existed in command and control, traffic control, administrative support, rifle strength, communications, motor maintenance, ammunition supply, and engineer capabilities. Also, the attached units—tank, antitank, and antiaircraft artillery battalions—needed to be permanently assigned to the division.

When the War Department published new tables of organization for the motorized division in the spring of 1942 (Chart 17), it differed considerably from the structure tested by Wallace. In those tables, the hand of McNair, who almost always opposed "special" units, was evident. The division closely resembled an infantry division. Motorized infantry regiments were to have an organization similar to standard infantry regiments. Gone were armored half-track personnel carriers, but the regiment was to have enough trucks to move all its men and equipment. The division headquarters and headquarters company and the artillery were identical to their counterparts in the infantry division, and the reconnaissance battalion was the same as that of the cavalry division. A reconnaissance company was added to the engineer battalion. The ordnance unit remained company size,