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126 unwieldy square division. Since the Army planned to introduce semiautomatic rifles and light air-cooled machine guns, Parker suggested that the 2d Division conduct tests to determine the most effective combination of automatic rifles and machine guns. Summerall agreed to the proposal but extended the study to encompass the total infantry division. The study was to concentrate on approved standard infantry weapons, animal-drawn combat trains, and motorized field trains. The chief of staff placed no limit on road space, a principal determinant of divisional organization before and immediately after World War I.

The Chief of Infantry, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Allen, who had responsibility for organizing and training infantry troops, agreed to the examination but objected to having the commander of the 2d Division supervise the tests, which he believed fell within the purview of his own office. Eventually Summerall agreed, and Allen assigned the job to the Infantry Board at Fort Benning, Georgia.

During the investigation several proposals surfaced for a triangular infantry division, which promised greater maneuverability, better command and control, and simplified communications and supply. Nevertheless, Army leaders turned down the idea. Maj. Bradford G. Chynoweth of the Infantry Board attributed the retention of the square division, which was imminently suitable for frontal attacks, to Summerall. As a former division and army corps commander in France, Summerall saw no need for change.

The question of the infantry division's organization lay dormant until October 1935, when Maj. Gen. John B. Hughes, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, revived it. In a memorandum for General Malin Craig, MacArthur's successor as Chief of Staff, Hughes suggested that the General Staff consider modernization of the Army's combat organizations. Although great strides had been made in weapons, equipment, transportation, and communications, organizations were still based on World War I experiences. He also noted that such organizational initiatives were the purview of the General Staff, an obvious reference to the resistance of the chief of infantry in 1929 to reexamine divisional organizations. Since the General Staff was responsible for total Army organization, Hughes thought it should conduct any such examination.

In November Craig canvassed senior commanders regarding reorganization issues. He noted the infantry division in particular had foot, animal, and motor units, all with varying rates of speed, which did not meet the demands of modern warfare. Craig wondered if the division were too large, and, if so, whether or not could it be reduced in size. Possibilities for reduction included moving support and service functions to army corps or army level, cutting infantry to three regiments, and reorganizing the field artillery into a three-battalion regiment. No consensus emerged. Even the three champions of infantry—the Infantry School, the Infantry Board, and the chief of infantry—failed to agree on a suitable organization, differing especially on the continued existence of infantry and field artillery brigades as intermediate headquarters between the regiment and the division.