Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/142

120 army headquarters he assigned eighteen army corps headquarters, and to the corps headquarters the fifty-four infantry divisions. The Regular Army cavalry corps, which comprised the 1st, 2d, and 3d Cavalry Divisions, was assigned to the Fourth Army, and the four mounted National Guard divisions to the GHQ. Organized Reserve cavalry divisions remained in those areas where the armies were to raise units.

In planning for the four armies, Brig. Gen. Charles E. Kilbourne, chief of the War Plans Division, suggested to MacArthur that he drive home to the president, the secretary of war, and the Congress exactly how the Army's strength had affected readiness. The Army could not even field four infantry divisions as a quick response force because of the lack the men to fill such a force and the bases to accommodate it. Furthermore, if such a force were concentrated, or even committed, it would be unable to support training of the reserves. Kilbourne viewed an increase in Army strength as unlikely but nevertheless recommended as a goal the maintenance of four peace-strength infantry divisions, one for each army, and five reinforced infantry brigades.

The War Department established an embryonic readiness force on 1 October 1933. Divisional forces returned to their pre-1927 configuration, with the 1st, 2d, and 3d Divisions having two active infantry brigades and the 4th through 9th Divisions having only one active brigade each. In the Fourth Corps Area the 4th Division also received a third active infantry regiment, another step closer to the four-division ready force. The next year the field artillery brigades of the 1st through 4th Divisions were realigned to consist of one 155mm. howitzer and two 75-mm. gun regiments, and each active infantry brigade was authorized a 75-mm. gun regiment. All field artillery units were partially active. No division or brigade was concentrated on a single post during the reorganization.

The four-army plan introduced some realism into the arrangements for mobilizing Regular Army infantry divisions, but no true emergency force existed because of personnel shortages. During the next few years the Army revised the preparedness plans by reassigning divisions and assigning new priorities to them, but no division could meet an immediate threat.

Even though the status of divisions between the two world wars fell far short of readiness because of low manning levels, developments in at least organizational theory were significant. Divisions designed to fight on a static front and endure heavy casualties were no longer acceptable. World armies sought divisions that could defeat an opponent with maneuver and firepower. Writers such as the Englishmen J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart led the way, advocating the employment of machines to restore mobility and maneuverability to the battlefield.