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 Brig. Gen. Richmond P. Davis, at Fort Lewis, Washington. Brigade commanders, however, were not granted similar authority.

While discussing the need to reconstitute the 1st Division as a combat unit, Drum stressed the importance of building esprit. Unfortunately, the few tangible symbols the Army had used to enhance morale were initially denied to divisions and brigades after the war. Regular Army soldiers returning from France were not allowed to wear divisional shoulder sleeve insignia because they "cluttered" the uniform. The men appealed to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, who subsequently approved the use of shoulder sleeve insignia throughout the Army. When a division adopted a "patch" design, soldiers put it on their uniforms and emblazoned it on their divisional flag. The other item, the campaign streamer, representing participation in a major operation was denied to headquarters of divisions and brigades because they were command and control units rather than fighting organizations. Although the policy was contested, it was not until after the 1st and 3d Divisions reestablished effective headquarters that the War Department granted division and brigade headquarters the right to display on their flags streamers symbolizing the campaigns in which they had directed their subordinate units.

A sharp decline in divisional readiness occurred after 1922, when Congress again cut the Regular Army's size, this time to 136,000 officers and enlisted men. The Chief of Staff, General of the Armies John J. Pershing, reduced the strength of the infantry division from 11,000 to 9,200 men, but he did not authorize the inactivation of any divisional elements. Four years later Congress expanded the Army Air Corps without a corresponding increase in the Army's total strength. Rather than cut the size of ground combat units, the War Department turned again to inactivating units. The Panama Canal Division lost an infantry regiment, the 8th Brigade an infantry battalion, and the 16th Brigade two infantry battalions. Given continuing personnel shortages, the chief of infantry complained in 1929 that not another man could be taken from his units if they were to conduct effective training. Therefore, another round of inactivations took place. The 8th, 10th, 12th, 14th, and 18th Brigades and the Philippine Division each lost a battal-