Page:John Banks Wilson - Maneuver and Firepower (1998).djvu/113

THE AFTERMATH OF WORLD WAR I Meeting between 22 June and 8 July 1920, the committee examined three questions: Was the World War I division too large? If so, should the Army adopt a smaller division comprising three infantry regiments? Finally, if a division of four infantry regiments were retained, could it be reduced to fewer than 20,000 men, a figure acceptable to Pershing?

The committee reviewed all previous divisional studies and recommendations; acquainted itself with views held by officers of the General Staff, departments, and operating services of the Army about divisions; and investigated the views about them developed at the service schools since the end of the war. Approximately seventy officers appeared before the committee, including Col. William (Billy) Mitchell of the Air Service and Brig. Gen. Samuel D. Rochenback, the former chief of the Tank Corps, who testified about two new weapon systems used in the war—the airplane and the tank.

From the evidence, the committee concluded that the wartime infantry division was too large and unwieldy. In reality it had been an army corps without the proper organization. The division's size made moving the unit by road and railroad or passing through lines an extremely complex and time-consuming process. Furthermore, its size had complicated the problems of command and control of all activities in combat.

The committee examined various organizational options. The argument for three (versus four) infantry regiments in the division centered on the division's probable area of employment, North America. Experts deemed another war in Europe unlikely, and they doubted that the Army would again fight on a battlefield like that seen in France. They felt technological advances in artillery, machine guns, and aviation made obsolete stabilized and highly organized lines and flanks resting on impassable obstacles, such as those encountered on the Western Front. Future enemies would most likely organize their forces in great depth; therefore, the Army had to be prepared to overcome that challenge.

Nevertheless, the committee believed a division of four infantry regiments, although lacking the flexibility of Pershing's suggested unit, would have the necessary mobility and striking power. Divisional support troops needed to be reduced, but the retention of the square division preserved the organizations for army corps and armies that had been developed during the war. Because most officers were familiar with those units, no change in doctrine was required above the division level. On a more mundane level, the retention of general officers' billets also influenced those who wanted to keep the square division. Its brigades required brigadier generals, which allowed officers to rise from second lieutenants to general officers within their specialties, while a smaller triangular division would terminate that progression at the colonel level. Concluding its examination, the committee decided a field commander could more readily modify the square division to oppose a lesser enemy than strengthen a smaller organization to fight a powerful foe.

The third question remained: Could the Army reduce the size of the square division to increase mobility? Recommendations to achieve this included a reduction