Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/93

Rh other. This is a natural and unavoidable effect of doing all things in one aembly, or collecting all authority into one center. When magitrates and people meet in one aembly, the former will for ever do as they pleae, provided they proceed with any degree of prudence and caution.

The conequence was, that the annual reviews were a farce; only in a very few intances, for egregious faults, were any excluded: and the two councils became perpetual, and independent of the people entirely. The illuions of ambition are very ubtle: if the motives of thee magitrates, to extend the duration of their authority, were the public good, we must confes they were very ignorant. It is mot likely they deceived themelves as well as their contituents, and mitook their own ambition for patriotim: but this is the progreive march of all aemblies; none can confine themelves within their limits, when they have an opportunity of trangreing them. Thee magitrates oon learned to conider their authority as a family property, as all others in general, in imilar circumtances, ever did, and ever will.

They behaved like all others in another repect too: their authority being now permanent, they immediately attack the indics, and transfer their power to themelves.

The whole hitory of Geneva, ince that period, follows of coure: the people, by their upinenes, had given up all balances, and betrayed their own privileges, as well as the prerogatives of their firt magitrates, into the hands of a few families.

The people of Geneva, as enlightened as any, have never conidered the neceity of joining with the indics, nor the indics that of joining the people,