Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/247

Rh may retrain it. If the regal authority preumes too far, he mut appeal to the other two. Without three diviions of power, tationed to watch each other, and compare each other's conduct with the laws, it will be impoible that the laws hould at all times preerve their authority, and govern all men.

Plato has ufficiently aerted the honour of the laws, and the neceity of proper guardians of them; but has no where delineated the various orders of guardians, and the neceity of a balance between them: he has, nevertheles, given us premies from whence the abolute neceity of uch orders and equipoies may be inferred; he has hewn how naturally every imple pecies of government degenerates. The aritocracy, or ambitious republic, becomes immediately an oligarchy—What hall be done to prevent it? Place two guardians of the laws to watch the aritocracy: one, in the hape of a king, on one ide of it; another, in the hape of a democratical aembly, on the other ide. The aritocracy, become an oligarchy, changes into a democracy—How hall it be prevented? By giving the natural aritocracy in ociety its rational and jut weight, and by giving it a regal power to appeal to, againt the madnes of the people. Democracy becomes a tyranny—How hall this be prevented? By giving it an able independent ally in an aritocratical aembly, with whom it may unite againt the unjut and illegal deigns of any one man.