Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/224

186 whereas, if you admit the people to a hare in the government, no michief can pring from the enate; but the man who aims at greater power than the ret of his fellow citizens, and has formed a faction in the enate, of all who are willing to partake of his councils and his crimes (for thoe who deliberate concerning public affairs ought to forefee every thing that is probable) this great, this awful peron, I fay, when called by the tribunes to appear before the people, mut give an account both of his actions and thoughts to this people, inconiderable as they are, and o much his inferiors; and, if found guilty, uffer the punihment he deerves: and, let the people themelves, when veted with o great a power, hould grow wanton, and, fduced by the wort of demagogues, become dangerous to the bet of citizens, (for the multitude generally give birth to tyranny) ome peron of conummate prudence, created dictator by yourelves, will guard asaint this evil, and not allow them to run into exces; and being inverted with abolute power, and ubject to no account, will cut off the infected part of the commonwealth, and not uffer that which is not yet infected to be vitiated, reform the laws, excite the citizens to virtue, and appoint uch magitrates as he thinks will govern with the greatet prudence: and having effected thee things within the pace of fix months, he will again become a private man, without receiving any other reward for thee actions, than that of being honoured for having performed them. Induced, therefore, by thee coniderations, and convinced that this is the mot perfect form of government, debar the people from nothing; but as you have granted them a power of chooing the annual magitrates, who are to preide over the