Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/214

176 conuls, enate, and people, had been centered in a ingle aembly of the people, collectively or repreentatively, will any man pretend to believe that they would have been long free, or ever great?

The ditribution of power was however never accurately or judiciouly made in that contitution: the executive was never ufficiently eparated from the legilative, nor had thee powers a controul upon each other defined with ufficient accuracy: the executive had not power to interpoe and decide between the people and the enate.

As we advance in this correpondence, we may ee caue to differ widely from the judgment of Polybius, "that it is impoible to invent a more perfect ytem of government." We may be convinced that the contitution of England, if its balance is een to play, in practice, according to the principles of its theory—that is to ay, if the people are fairly and fully repreented, o as to have the power of dividing or chooing, of drawing up hill or down, intead of being dipoed of by a few lords—is a ytem much more perfect. The contitutions of everal of the United States, it is hoped, will prove themelves improvements, both upon the Roman, the Spartan, and the Englih commonwealths.