Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/213

Rh occaions in which they may tand in need of their favour, dare not reit or oppoe their will.

In like manner, they are not eaily brought to obtruct the deigns of the conuls, becaue all of them in general, and every one in particular, become ubject to their authority, when in the field.

Such being the power of each order to hurt and ait each other, their union is adapted to all contingencies, and it is impoible to invent a more perfect ytem. When the common fear of a foreign enemy compels them to act in concert, uch is the trength of the government, that nothing neceary is omitted, or comes too late, ince all vie with each other in directing their thoughts to the public good, and their endeavours to carry their deigns into execution. The commonwealth, from the peculiar frame of it, becomes irreitibie, and attains whatever it propoes.

When, in conequence of victory, they live in properity and affluence, enjoying their good fortune free from the fear of a foreign enemy, they grow, through eae and flattery, inolent and proud; their commonwealth is then chiefly oberved to relieve itelf: for when any branch of it becomes ambitious, and, welling beyond its bounds, aims at unwarrantable power, being ubject to the controul of the other two, it cannot run into any exces of power or arrogance; but all three mut remain in the terms precribed by the contitution.

Thus, my dear Sir, you ee that Polybius's opinion of different orders, checks, and balances, in a commonwealth, is very different from that of Mr. Turgot. The Roman contitution formed the noblet people, and the greatet power, that has ever exited. But if all the powers of the conuls,