Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/193

Rh citizen may be ruined by their particular deciions. The whole power is here united in one body; and though there is no external pomp that indicates a depotic way, yet the people feel the effects of it every moment.

Hence it is, that many of the princes of Europe, whoe aim has been levelled at arbitrary power, have contantly et out with uniting in their own perons all the branches of magitracy, and all the great offices of tate.

I allow, indeed, that the mere hereditary aritocracy of the Italian republicks, does not anwer exactly to the depotic power of the eatern princes. The number of magitrates ometimes lotens the power of the magitracy; the whole body of the nobles do not always concur in the ame deigns; and different tribunals are erected that temper each other. Thus, at Venice, the legilative power is in the council, the executive in the pregadi, and the judiciary in the quarantia. But the michief is, that thee different tribunals are compoed of magitrates all belonging to the ame body; which contitutes almot one and the ame power.

The judiciary power ought not to be given to a tanding enate; it hould be exercied by perons taken from the body of the people, as at Athens, at certain times of the year, and puruant to a form and manner precribed by law, in order to erct a tribunal that hould lat only as long as neceity requires.

By this means the power of judging, a power o terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular tate or proeion, becomes, as it were, inviible. People have not then the judges continually preent to their view; they fear the office, but not the magitrate. In