Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/192

154 laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.

Again, there is no liberty, if the power of judging be not eparated from the legilative and executive powers: were it joined with the legilative, the life and liberty of the citizens would be expoed to arbitrary controul; for the judge would then be legilator: were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppreor.

There would be an end of every thing (tout eroit perdu) were the ame man, or the ame body, whether of princes, of the nobles, or of the people, to exercie thoe three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public reolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of individuals.

Mot kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government, becaue the prince, who is inveted with the two firt powers, leaves the third to his ubjects. In Turkey, where thee three powers are united in the ultan's peron, the ubjects groan under the weight of a mot frightful oppreion. In the republics of Italy, where thee three powers are united, there is les liberty than in our monarchies. Hence their government is obliged to have recoure to as violent methods for its upport, as even that of the Turks; witnes the tate inquiitors at Venice, and the lion's mouth, into which every informer may at all hours throw his written accuations: what a ituation mut the poor citizen be in under thoe poor republics! The fame body of magitrates are poeed, as executors of the laws, of the whole power they have given themelves in quality of legilators. They might plunder the tate by their general determinations; and as they have likewie the judiciary power in their hands, every private citizen