Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/159

Rh with authority, limited or unlimited, over their lives and fortunes; and, the next moment after his election, to commence a upicion of him, that hall prompt them to watch ail his words, actions, and motions, and dipoe them to renounce and punih him. They chooe him, indeed, becaue they think he knows more, and is better dipoed, than the generality, and even than themelves very often. Indeed the bet ue of a repreentative aembly, aries from the cordial affection and unreerved confidence which ubits between it and the collective body of the people. It is by uch a kind and candid intercoure alone, that the wants and deires of the people can be made known, on the one hand, or the neceities of the public communicated or reconciled to them, on the other. In what did uch a confidence in one aembly end, in Venice, Geneva, Bicay, Poland, but an aritocracy, and an oligarchy? There is no pecial providence for Americans, and their natures are the ame with others.

Dear Sir,

O demontrate the neceity of two aemblies in the legilature, as well as of a third branch in it, to defend the executive authority; it may be laid down as a firt principle, that neither liberty nor jutice can be ecured to the individuals of a nation, nor its properity moted,