Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/158

120 would be envy; becaue there will be, among the econd clas, everal, whoe fortunes, families, and merits, in the acknowledged judgment of all, approach near to the firt; and, from the ordinary illuions of elf-love and elf-interet, they and their friends will be much dipoed to claim the firt place as their own right. This will introduce controvery and debate, as well as emulation; and thoe who wih for the firt place, and cannot obtain it, will of coure endeavour to keep down the peaker as near upon a level with themelves as poible, by paring away the dignity and importance of his office, as we aw in Venice, Poland, and every where ele.

A ingie aembly thus contituted, without any counterpoie, balance, or equilibrium, is to have all authority, legilative, executive, and judicial, concentered in it. It is to make a contitution and laws by its own will, execute thoe laws at its pleaure, and adjudge all controveries, that arie concerning the meaning and application of them, at dicretion. What is there to retrain them from making tyrannical laws, in order to execute them in a tyrannical manner?

Will it be pretended, that the jealouy and vigilance of the people, and their power to dicard them at the next election, will retrain them? Even this idea uppoes a balance, an equilibrium, which Mr. Turgot holds in o much contempt; it uppoes the people at large to be a check and controul to the repreentative aembly. But this would be found a mere deluion. A jealouy between the electors and the elected neither ought to exit, nor is poible to exit. It is a contradiction to uppoe, that a body of electors hould have at one moment a warm affection and entire confidence in a man, o as to intrut him with