Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/137

Rh hundred, and dipoing the magitracies and offices according to men's etates, leaving to the multitude their votes in electing, and the power of judging certain procees by appeal. This council of four hundred was choen, one hundred out of each tribe, and eems to have been a body repreentative of the people, though the people collective reerved a hare of power to themelves.

In all free tates, the evil to be avoided is tyranny; that is to ay, the umma imperii, or unlimited power, olely in the hands of the one, the few, or the many. Though we cannot prolong the period of a commonwealth beyond the decree of heaven, or the date of its nature, any more than human life beyond the trength of the eminal virtue; yet we may manage a ickly contitution, and preerve a trong one; we may watch, and prevent accidents; we may turn off a great blow from without, and purge away an ill humour that is lurking within; and render a tate long lived, though not immortal. Some phyicians have thought, that if it were practicable to keep the everal humours of the body in an exact balance of each with its oppoite, it might be immortal; and o perhaps would a political body, if the balance of power could be always held exactly even.

All independent bodies of men eem naturally to divide into the three powers, of the one, the few, and the many. A free people met together, as oon as they fall into any acts of civil ocietv, do of themelves divide into three ranks. The firt is, that of ome one eminent pirit, who, having ignalized his valour and fortune in defence of his country, or by the practice of popular arts at home, comes to have great influence on