Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/11

Rh executive from the legilative power, and of the judicial from both—and a balance in the legilature, by three independent, equal branches—are perhaps the three only dicoveries in the contitution of a free government, ince the intitution of Lycurgus, Even thee have been o unfortunate, that they have never pread: the firt has been given up by all the nations, excepting one, who had once adopted it; and the other two, reduced to practice, if not invented, by the Englih nation, have never been imitated by any other except their own decendants in America. While it would be rah to ay, that nothing further can be done to bring a free government, in all its parts, till nearer to perfection—the repreentations of the people are mot obviouly uceptible of improvement. The end to be aimed at, in the formation of a repreentative aembly, eems to be the ene of the people, the public voice: the perfection of the portrait conits in its likenes. Numbers, or property, or both, hould be the rule; and the proportions of electors and members an affair of calculation. The duration hould not be o long that the deputy hould have time to forget the opinions of his contituents. Corruption in elections is the great enemy of freedom. Among the proviions to prevent it, more frequent elections, and a more general privilege of voting, are not all that might be devied. Dividing the ditricts, diminihing the ditance of travel, and confining the choice to reidents, would be great advances towards,