Page:John Adams - A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America Vol. I. (1787).djvu/105

Rh Such arc the happy effects of the pirit of families, when they are not bridled by an executive authority, in the hands of a firt magitrate on one hand, and by an aembiy of the people in peron, or by adequate repreentation, on the other. Such are the bleings which, in coure of ages, pring from a neglect in the beginning, to etablih three orders, and a perfect balance between them. There can be, in the nature of things, no balance without three powers. The aritocracy is always more agacious than an aembly of the people collectively, or by repreentation, and always proves an overmatch in policy, ooner or later. They are always more cunning too than a firt magitrate, and always make of him a doge of Venice, a mere ceremony, unles he makes an alliance with the people to upport him againt them. What is the whole hitory of the wars of the barons but one demontration of this truth! What are all the tanding armies in Europe, but another. Thee were all given to kings by the people, to defend them againt aritocracies. The people have been generally of Mr. Turgot's mind, that balances, and different orders, were unneceary, and, harraed to death with the domination of noble families, they have generally urrounded the thrones with troops, to humble them. They have ucceeded o far as generally to make the nobles dependent on the crown, but having given up the balance which they might have held in their own hands, they are till ubject to as much aritocratical domination, as the crowns think proper to permit. In Venice, the aritocratical paion for curbing the prince and the people, has been carried to its utmot length. It is ing